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PREFACE
The question of union security has been a disputed topic
for many years and the controversy still rages. Union security
agreements are instruments which require union membership as a
condition of initial or continued employment. Union security
arrangements exist in many forms; this paper is intended to pro-
vide the background and basis of the issue.
Chapter I begins with a discussion of the labor movement
and the relationship of the worker and a union. Chapter II de-
scribes union security in its various forms. In Chapter III an
examination of the Taft-Hartley Act is undertaken with specific
reference to its impact on the negotiation of union security pro-
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Brief History of Trade Unions
Unionism in America has a long history which started in the princi-
pal industrial centers along the Atlantic coast. An estimate made in 1836
shoved that in the five industrial centers there were 300,000 members in
160 local unions. In I85O, due to the expansion of the market, the first
national union of workers in a single craft came into existence. This
first national union of workers in a single craft was made up of typogra-
phers; some unions that followed were:
1853, the journeymen stonecutters
1854, the hatters
1858, the iron molders
1863, the locomotive engineers
1864, the cigar makers
2
1865, the bricklayers and masons.
At the turn of the century, union membership was nearly fifty per-
cent less than what it was in 1887 and the American Federation of Labor
j3. Wight Bakke and Clark Kerr, Unions. Management and the Public































2claimed about 250,000 members. With the onset of a depression in 1904,
wages were reduced, many trade agreements were "broken, and unfavorable
punitive antiboycott decisions in the case of the Dahbury Hatters, the
Buck's Stone and Range case, and the MacNamara case in 1911 caused member-
ship in unions to drop sharply until activity was again renewed by the
economic surge of 1910-191^ • In addition to the economic expansion of the
period, the coal miners and the clothing and textile workers helped in-
crease union membership by their organization efforts.
There were many events in the early period, 1910-1920, which
strengthened the position of unionism. In 1912 there was a large socialist
vote, and the creation of a Secretary of Labor with a labor man, W. B.
Wilson, named as director. Large masses of semiskilled and unskilled
workers were organized to support the gains in industry caused by the war
effort, and the representation of labor in government. The Adamson Eight-
Hour Act of 1916 caused membership in unions to rise to a new high in 1920.
From 1920 on there was a continual decline in unionism which was
precipitated by racial discrimination, continued government intervention
after the war, failure of the steel strike, and a failure to organize the
automobile industry.
The National Industrial Recovery Act of 1933 aided the cause of
unionism and improved the posture of labor. This event gave the unorgan-
ized workers in the mass production Industries reassurance that labor was
a friend of the government. It provided a feeling of satisfaction that
workers' demands for higher wages, lower hours, and better working condi-
tions would be recognized.
^Tbid., p. 59-

An important issue that resulted in a struggle within the American
Federation of Labor was the craft versus industrial organization. In 1933
a group of rubber workers decided to organize and applied for a National
Charter. When the AFL representative arrived from Washington, D. C, a
reorganization by crafts was instituted, much to the dislike of the new
members. Finally, a movement precipitated by John L. Lewis of the United
Mine Workers, who represented thirty-one percent of the membership of the
AFL, insisted that the industrial union principle be applied to organizing
workers in mass-production industries. His argument was based on the fact
that mechanization had reduced most skills to uniform levels and during a
work period many different tasks were performed by a single worker. At the
San Francisco Convention in 193^-t John L. Lewis and David Dubinsky, leader
of the International Ladies 1 Garment Workers, were elected to the Execu-
tive Council of the American Federation of Labor. These two leaders of the
largest industrial unions began to change the organization of the AFL in
spite of the ingrained dislike of the craft leaders. At the Atlantic City
Convention in 1935 the Lewis proposal was put to a vote and defeated. The
following day nine labor leaders, under the leadership of John L. Lewis,
organized the Committee for Industrial Organizations. This committee
existed temporarily under the watchful eye of the Federation until the
claims of dual unionism grew so loud further steps had to be taken.
The Executive Council, without John L. Lewis who had resigned when
the Committee was formed, ordered the CIO to disband and align itself with
the aims of the Federation. The struggle went on for several years. The
CIO continued to grow and gained strength with its industrial organization.
By June 1937 the separation of the American Federation of Labor and the
Committee for Industrial Organization was complete.

After their historic civil war and eventual split, the two unions
continued to grow and to gain new members.
The next revolutionary step in the trade union movement came in the
latter part of 1955 when the AH. and the CIO were once again united. En©
men who were largely responsible for this unification were George Meany and
Walter P. Reuther. Because of the size of the organization, a complete
amalgamation was Impossible, and unity was achieved at the top levels only,
at that time, with the remainder to "be united in time. Complete unification
was accomplished by 1961.
Corruption in the labor movement was a factor that aided in bringing
the two organizations together, When the merger was completed, a committee
on ethical practices was formed to help solve the problem of corruption.
Shortly after the merger, charges against affiliated unions were presented.
!Qte government conducted hearings, which resulted in the expulsion of the
International Brotherhood of Teamsters and two smaller unions in 1957 •
By this action the AFL-CIQ removed all doubt that it was making an attempt
to eliminate corruption in the labor field.
At the present time there are approximately 13«5 million card carrying
2
members of the AFL-CIO who participate in more than 60,000 local unions.
In addition to the members of the AFL-CIO there are 2.8 million workers who
are members of independent or unaffiliated unions. Union membership accounts
for 22.2 percent of the total labor force.
"The Hands That Build America, Stew York Times, November 17, 1963,
sec. 11, p. 2.
o
^FL~CI0, "This is the AFL-CIO," Washington, D. C, International
Relations Department, February 196k, Pub. Ho. 20.
*%. S. Department of Commerce, Statistical Abstract of the_ United
States
















5Why Workers Join Unions
For over a hundred years men have debated whether it was right, con-
venient, wise, or necessary for the working class to organize and bargain
collectively for better working standards and to eliminate unfair labor
practices. The question of whether to permit the organization of labor and
collective bargaining is no longer an issue. How the problem is to what
extent organization and collective bargaining can be permitted.
In American society, unions are recognized as a powerful and challeng-
ing social, economic institution because of their influence on the economy,
their solidarity of membership, and their control of the exploitation of
the labor force by management.
Organized labor began its expansion in the eighteenth century and
its growth has continued, even though there are those who believe it should
be restricted or eliminated. The reasons for this growth no doubt are based
on the following issues: higher wages, shorter hours, and longer vacations.
These issues can be grouped as the purely economic motives that stimulate
membership; in many cases these economic factors provide a complete and
parochial analysis.
Behavioristically speaking, unions fulfill a social ambition of the
workers. Participation as a member of the union provides an opportunity
to become a leader in the business community, to associate with top manage-
ment in discussing production and labor difficulties, and to attend meet-
ings and conventions which in totality add to his personal prestige among
his fellow workers and in his community.
Psychologically, a union fulfills the personality requirements of
the individual through self-expression, freedom of action, and ingenuity.

6In the early days the worker had very liadted alternatives in labor problems
or grievances; specifically, he could continue to work or go elsewhere to
seek employment
.
Industrial relations through unions in the present era have pro-
gressed to such a level that a worker today has a feeling of security and
is able to speak freely and sake requests that were unheard of in the past.
In a broader spectrum, union membership is an extension of the democratic
process that people in the United States cherish. !Ihe union is a device
which provides a worker freedom of egression and a feeling of accomplish-
ment when a grievance is resolved by a change in method or when a condition
that had been a source of irritation is eliminated. To say that one motive
is more or less important than another is purely academic.
For the union member there are more benefits to be gained than the
standard triad of organizing, collective bargaining and political action,
Tae unions participate in many extracurricular activities which increase
benefits to members. Some of these activities are educational classes,
social centers for retirees, investment in low or middle income housing,
retirement counseling, health centers, and scholarships.
Types and Functions of a Union
Samuel Gompers, a leading labor leader in the early part of the cen-
tury, said;
.... The primary essential in our mission has been the
protection of the wage-worker, now; to increase his wages; to
cut hours off the long workday, which was fclUlug him; to
"How Unions Spend Their Off-hours," Business Week, September 18,
196p.

improve the safety and the sanitary conditions of the vork
shop; to free him from the tyrannies, petty or otherwise,
which served to make his existence a slavery. These, in
the nature of things, I repeat, were and are the primary
objects of trade unionism*1
Unions may be of several types. According to Dale Yoder, unions
are classified as revolutionary, reformist, or business unions.
A revolutionary union has as a primary objective the destruction or
overthrow of the present political and social controls andthe substitution
therefor of a radically different social and political order. The reformist
type unions attempt to change present policy within the framework of the
existing society. When their proposals extend beyond the area of working
conditions they are practicing uplift unionism. Many early unions attempted
to make reforms in such areas as the abolition of imprisonment for debt,
establishment of free schools, institution of systems of taxation, and
elimination of property requirements for voting.
Business unionism is the most common type of American unionism. The
objectives of business unions are sought through collective action. The
business union strives to improve the working and living conditions of em-
p
ployees through the principal official called the business agent.
According to the president of the AFL-CIO, a good union must possess
four qualities: First, a good union must be able to protect its members and
win a reasonable measure of economic justice for them; second, a good union
"ijamuel Gompers, Labor and the Common Welfare (ijew York: Dutton &
Co., Inc., 1919), P. 20.
'Dale Yoder, Personnel Management and Industrial Relations (5th ed.j
Englewood Cliffs, U. J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 196*0, pp. 16^-65.

8must be run by the members and for the members; third, a good union must be
an honest jaion; and fourth, a union must look beyond its own horizons.
The power of a particular union depends on its position in the
local hierarchy. Unions reflect the environment in which they exist.
Many factors affect the operation of a union such as whether the
industry is expanding or declining, the employers are antagonistic or co-
operative, men or women form the majority, skilled, semiskilled or unskilled
workers are members, and whether the workers are temporarily or permanently
employed.
Membership in unions expands during prosperous times in the business
cycle and under a liberal Federal Government. Depressions and conservative
federal administrations tend to restrict membership.
Unions have attempted to broaden and improve the provisions of the
Pair Labor Standards Act which sets minimum wages and maximum hours for
workers. The present minimum wage of $1.25 per hour is not paid uniformly
throughout the country, and presently there is pressure to increase it. In
addition to improving wa^es and working conditions, unions attempt to bar-
gain with employers, eliminate discrimination, protect the labor movement
against corruption, act as lobbies in Congress supporting legislation that
will aid workers, and encourage workers to vote. Other benefits that unions
have supported for their workers are unemployment insurance, workmen's com-
pensation, universal free public education and medical care for the aged in
addition to social security.
The union acts as the employees* mouthpiece in any grievances the
workers have with the employer. They take testimony from the worker and
P. 31-
"What's a Good Union?" Hew York Times, November 17, 19^3, sec. 11,
I"
act as his official representative. In securing labor contracts, the union
leaders, elected by the employees, arbitrate and negotiate the contract
while the work is continuing.
In the event a contract settlement cannot be reached, the union
leaders, after a vote of the membership, announce a strike deadline. If
the workers go out on strike, the union usually provides assistance through
a strike fund to enable members to take care of pressing needs while they
are on strike. It is obvious that a strike is not the most beneficial tool
in labor-management relations due to the fact that during a strike the
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THE UNION SECURITY ISSUE
The development of unions in the United States was retarded by a
variety of factors which emphasized Individual rather than collective
activity as the "best method of achieving economic progress. In the nine-
teenth century, the abundance of free land, large numbers of ambitious im-
migrants, development of continent-wide markets, and fierce individualism
of employers led unions to believe that they would be unable to depend on
class solidarity to maintain union membership, dues, and strength. To com-
bat these deterrents the unions turned to contractual provisions requiring
the employer to maintain membership.
Union security refers to the right of the union to represent its
members and in many cases nonmembers in negotiating agreements with the
1
employer and enforcing the provisions of such agreements. Union security
contracts are formal statements which define the status of the union with
reference to the work force.
With the passage of the National Labor Relations [Wagner] Act in
1935/ "the need for union security was theoretically eliminated. This act
outlawed employer discrimination against workers because of membership or
participation in unions and required employers to bargain with certified




nleaders believed that employers were opposed to unions, and rival unionism
increased. These two issues provided union leaders with additional justifi-
cation for the necessity of union security provisions.
Union security can take many fonas with respect to the employer-
aqployee relationship. The closed shop is an agreement whereby the employer
agrees that all workers must belong to the union to retain their jobs. He
further agrees that when hiring new workers he will hire only members of
the union or those who agree to become members. In a union shop the employer
agrees that all the workers must belong to the union to keep their jobs.
The employer may hire anyone, but the workers he hires must join the union
within a specified time, usually thirty days, or lose their jobs. This is
the most common form of union security in existence today.
The agency shop is a form of security in which the employer and the
union agree that a worker shall not be forced to join or remain a member of
the union to keep his job. The worker has the choice of joining or not
joining the union; however, if he elects not to join he, nevertheless, mu3t
pay to the union a sum equal to the union dues. This sum represents a fee
charged to the worker by the union for acting as his agent in collective
bargaining and in policing the union contract.
Maintenance of membership is an agreement which states that all
present and future members of the union must remain in the union for the
duration of the contract to keep their jobs. A worker is free to join if he
wants to and those who are members are given a fifteen-day period at the ex-
piration of the contract to resign their membership and retain employment.
The preferential shop is an agreement with the employer that stipu-
lates that union members will be given preference in hiring and layoffs.

12
In scene cases, nonunion members were hired until the employer was able to
find union members to replace them.
In the United States the struggle between labor and management began
in 1792 when the shoemakers in Philadelphia organized a local union to
m
bargain collectively. Some VJk years have passed and the issue still is
being debated: IS union security necessary and what type of union security
will please the rank and file, the employees, and the courts? Historically,
unions have favored the closed shop, whereas management policy has favored
the open shop where the employer refuses to recognize any union as the bar-
gaining agent for the employees but deals with the workers on an individual
basis.
In the days before the Iforris-Laguardia Act of 1931, the yellow-dog
contract was the Guardian of the open shop policy which required employees
to agree not to participate in any union or take part in any strike organized
against the employer. While the Wagner Act furthered union security, it also
limited it to some extent. The Wagner Act aided the cause of union security
by encouraging unionization and, therefore, opened up the opportunity for
the attainment of closed and union shops. In section 8 (3) of the Wagner
Act there are two restrictions which limit union security. This section
permitted closed or union abops sxcept in those cases vhere the union had
been dominated or assisted by the employer, or the union did not represent
a majority in the bargaining unit.
The open and closed shops have "been, inadequate in settling labor
difficulties or satisfying the needs of employers and employees. The
national labor policy was not subject to any drastic change during the
"'•"What the Unions Really Want," Hew York Times , November 17, 1963,
sec. 11, p. 3.
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twelve-year period between 1935-19V?. The turmoil created in 19^7 by pass-
age of the Labor Management Relations [Taft-Hartley] Act continues unre-
solved. Although there is no indication that the ultimate goal of a closed
shop has changed, union leaders are concentrating today on establishment
of the union shop.
The major complaint stemming from union security is that a worker is
coerced into joining a union. Discussing this issue and defending the union's
position, Harold J. Buttenburg and Clinton 3. Golden state:
Of cource it's coercion. That's what all the argument is
about; the right to force someone to do something against
his will. But this is not a legitimate objection to the union
shop, as coercion is the fundamental basis of organized so-
ciety. In fact, civilization can be said to have attained
maturity when men become intelligent enough -to order their
affairs and compel the recalcitrant man, the ignorant man, to
submit to certain compulsory rules for the common good of all
man* I cannot drive through a red light, although I have
enough good sense not to drive carelessly through an inter-
section; but, because other men lack such sense, for the com-
mon good, I am coerced into stopping for a red light, although
no cars may be coming from the opposite direction.
2
In the following ciiapter the Taft-Hartley Act will be discussed
with respect to union membership.
Chamber of Commerce of the United States, "The Issue: Choice
or Compulsion?* Washington, D. C, 1965, P- 3*
"^Bakke and Kerr, p. 132.

CHAPTER III
THE TAFT-HARTLEY ACT REQUIREMENTS WITH
RESPECT TO UNION MEMBERSHIP
Application to Union Agreements
Labor legislation was strengthened in 1935 vith passage of the
National Labor Relations Act, commonly referred to as the Wagner Act. The
purpose of this act was to eliminate the abuses of the labor force by
employers, force employers to bargain collectively with employees, and
generally accept unionism as public policy. Among the provisions of this
act, the closed shop -was permitted when negotiated properly. This influenc-
ed a shift in the balance of power from employer to employee and as a result
union power was strengthened.
Persistent industrial unrest for twelve years following the passage
of the Wagner Act "brought about congressional inquiry into the factors con-
tributing to unsatisfactory labor relations.
In 19^7 > as a result of its investigations, Congress amended the
Wagner Act by passing the Taft-Hartley Act. Original 1 y, the Wagner Act out-
lined a series of unfair la'bor practices on the part of employers which
often led to the denial of employee rights and resulted in labor disputes.
The Taft-Hartley Act, in an effort to neutralize the power struggle between
unions and management, adopted the view that such unrest was in part caused
by certain undesirable practices by labor unions. Nevertheless, it clearly





bargaining, so that industrial peace can be secured without forced settle-
ment of labor disputes through governmental intervention.
The fundamental objective of this legislation was to guarantee the
individual worker the right to select the representation he desired, free
from the coercive pressure of either the union or the employer. As a part
of the process, the act outlawed the closed shop and made it illegal for
employers to hire union members exclusively or to discriminate against non-
union members in the hiring of new workers.
Under section 8 (a) , the Taft-Hartley Act permitted employees to
negotiate the union shop, a less restrictive form of union security:
... an agreement with a labor organization ... to
require as a condition of employment membership therein on
or after the thirtieth day following the beginning of such
employment of the effective date of such agreement, which-
ever is the later . • • •*
In addition, the Taft-Hartley Act provided protection for the em-
ployer regarding his freedom of speech concerning the union issue. The
employer could state his position freely if it did not contain a promise
of benefit or threat of reprisal to the workers for their participation or
non-participation in union activities. It should be noted that neither
the Taft-Hartley Act nor any other federal labor act requires an employer
to grant a union security clause in an agreement. There are many agreements
in existence that contain no security clauses. In 1958-59/ nineteen percent
of all workers considered in the Bureau of Labor Statistics study (Table l)
James B. Wason, Section Ik (b) of the Taft-Hartley Act and State






bad no union security clauses in their contracts. Where such clauses do
exist, however, the union shop is the most common form of union security
at the present time.
Union shop and natntenance-of-membership provisions vere permitted
"by the Taft-Hartley Act after a special vote of the membership. When the
act was passed, it was believed that employees, given complete freedom to
decide, would reject compulsory unionism. The validity of this belief was
tested by numerous national Labor Relations Board secret ballot elections
conducted among organized firms. These elections began in 19^7 and continued
until 1951. There were 6,5^2,564 workers eligible to vote; 5*5^7,478 valid
ballots vere cast, and an overwhelming majority of <£L$ were cast in favor
of union security.
Such elections were discontinued in 1951 by the Taft-Humphrey amend-
ments and Senator Robert A. Taft, one of the sponsors of the Taft-Hartley
Act, concluded that Mthe special union security elections were a waste of
2
government money, expended, only to prove the obvious."
The Taft-Humphrey amendments, which permitted negotiations for union
shop and maintenanee-of-membership without prior voting, also retained the
little-known and seldcm-used shop de-authorization poll. This de-
authorization vote is taken by the national Labor Relations Board when
thirty percent of the employees in a bargaining unit petition to rescind
the union* 8 authority to make union security agreements. If a majority of
these employees vote to rescind the authority in a de-authorization election,
it becomes illegal for the parties to negotiate a union security contract
HafL-CIO, The Truth About Right-to-Work Laws (Washington: February,




for one year. These elections are uncojsnon. The ability of employees to
rescind the union shop re<juirera3nt is a powerful escape provision, the
presence of which tends to Imp union representatives alert to the needs of
the ooabership.
The Taft-Hartley Act provided that an es©ioyer could call for an
election to determine the bargaining agent. Once the agent was determined,
a new election could not be held for twelve mouths. In addition, the unions
were liable if the contract -was brolien or they elected to participate in a
jurisdictional dispute or unlawful boycott.
The act further provided that sixty days prior to the termination
of a bargaining agreement both labor and management must notify each otl:
of impending plans to terminate or nodify the .jent. If agreement can-
not be reached, the sta\ eeral conciliation agencies must be notified
and any employees who it plant within the sixty-day cooling off
period lose their status as employees under the act and will not be rein-
stated by the national Labc- .uLans Board* C2ii3 provision minimizes the
danger of work stoppage before the interestee, parties /e had an opportun.
to participate in the bargaining process, Where the national health and
safety are concerned, this sixty-day period provides the President with
enough time to examine the facts preventing agraeiaent and to detenr.
whether to seek an injunction to prevent a strilse or loc& out.
The Taft-Hartley Act expanded the national Labor Relations Board
from three to five maribers. The board, which investigates unfair labor
practices, was e2£panded to include an office of General Counsel whose primary
duty was to determine those cases which should be prosecuted. The national
Labor Relations Board was directed to confine its jurisdiction to industries

19
covered ty the act (interstate), and in carrying out its duties it was
ordered not to concern itself with unfair labor practices "that were older
than six months.
Regarding the Taft-Hartley Act, Phillip Murray, the leader of the
CIO, claimed that:
. . . the Taft-Hartley bill was conceived in sin, that it
was a sinful piece of legislation, and that its promoters
were diabolical men who, seething with hatred, designed or
contrived this ugly measure for the purpose of imposing their
wrath upon the millions of organized and unorganized workers
throughout the United States of America,1
The Taft-Hartley Act received vigorous opposition from labor leaders
throughout the nation. However, it was accepted by both management and rani:
and file union members because it provided individual workers the freedom
of selection regarding union membership.
Restrictions on Union Security Agreements
In the construction, maritime, and casual trade unions, after the
closed shop was declared illegal, unions were ineffective in their control
of working conditions without having control of hiring. Employees in these
industries normally work for several employers, and leave a job when it is
completed. To alleviate this problem, Congress enacted the Landrum-Griffin
Act in 1959 , relaxed the restrictions of the Taft-Hartley Act that applied
to the construction industry. The Landrum-Griffin Act legalized prehire
agreements in the construction industry. Pre-hire agreements allow em-
ployers to employ union members, where available, prior to the commencement




of work. Such 3greements make union membership compulsory after seven
days of employment, rather than thirty days as provided by the Taft-Hartley
Act, provided that state lav permits union security agreements . Union
security agreements in the construction industry can also require an employer
to notify the union of vacancies to enable the union to refer qualified
applicants for employment.
The Taft-Hartley Act caused considerable controversy in the maritime
industry regarding the legality of the hiring hall. The hiring hall is an
employment office, usually financed by employers and a union, and frequently
controlled by the union, "where maritime employees report when they are out
of work and desire employment. The idea behind the hiring hall is to give
first choice of work to regular employees, who are usually union members,
and the remainder of the Jobs are distributed to anyone Interested in work-
ing. The purpose of the hiring hall is to organize the labor force, and
provide employers with a supply of workers when needed.
The national Labor Relations Board, the courts, and the parties
vera faced with the question; Does the closed shop policy of the Taft-
Hartley Act apply to hiring halls? The NLRB ruled that if hiring halls were
not discriminating in their referral of employees and the employers were
able to reject employees recommended by the hiring halls, they were not
violating t2ie closed shop provision of the act. For a hiring hall to be
found discriminatory, a complaint by an individual, a union, or a company,
followed by proof that the discrimination did take place, is necessary. As
long as obvious discrimination does not take place, the hiring hall and
Commerce Clearing House, Inc., Guidebook to Labor Relations (Chicago,















closed shop practices are difficult to attack under the provisions of the
Taft-Hartley Act.
The Taft-Hartley Act requires financial support of the union as the
only condition of membership . The union shop requirement that a worker must
join a union and remain a member for the duration of the agreement is
basically a requirement that the employee join the union and pay his dues
and initiation fee. Nothing more is required and the national Labor Rela-
tions Board, the agency which interprets and administers the law, has ruled
that employees cannot be discharged for lack of participation in union ac-
tivities, failure to pay strike fund assessments, failure to pay a union-
imposed fine, or refusal to participate in an initiation ceremony.
The Iree Rider Problem
Beginning in 1935* employers were compelled to recognize unionism
and to bargain collectively. However, from 1935 until the Taft-Hartley Act
became law in 19^7, unions were able to negotiate closed shop contracts;
therefore membership in unions became compulsory in those industries where
closed shop contracts were negotiated.
When the Taft-Hartley Act restated the federal policy toward labor
and contracts with employers, closed shops were banned, workers were given
the freedom of choice regarding union membership, and unions were required
to bargain for all employees in the bargaining unit, when a contract was
negotiated. A result of this policy was granting recognition to a single
union in those units where, by referendum, employees negotiated a contract
to specify the bargaining representative for the purpose of collective
bargaining. Unions were organized on an industrial, trade, or craft basis
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in each shop to avoid dual unionism and to establish exclusive jurisdiction.
If the union negotiated with management an increase of twenty-cents per hour
for workers in a shop, the members of the union and the non-members as well
would benefit from the collective bargaining. The non-members could not be
paid less than the union members or be excluded from the wage increase.
Section 9 (a) of the Taft-Hartley Act states:
. • . collective bargaining representatives selected by
the majority in the unit shall be the exclusive representa-
tives of all the employees in the unit for purposes of col-
lective bargaining in respect to tfates of pay, wages, hours
of employment or other conditions of employment . . . •*
This requirement for unit-wide bargaining is the basis for establish-
ing a national policy which permits negotiation of collective bargaining
agreements requiring union membership and the payment of union dues and
initiation fees. The unions call this provision of the Taft-Hartley Act the
free rider clause. The unions feel that workers in the bargaining unit who
receive the benefits of higher wages, shorter hours, better working condi-
tions and fringe benefits and who refuse to contribute to the union dues
and initiation fees are free riders.
The exclusive bargaining rights granted to the union deny the indi-
vidual non-member, who is usually in the minority group, the right to bargain
with the employer on an individual basis independent of the union. Father
Edward A. Keller, C.S.C., has stated:
. . . the most important answer to the "free rider" argu-






Hartley Acts) sought authority to represent not only their
own numbers but also all other employees in the bargaining
units (exclusive representation).-*-
The unions' argument is that the non-member vho is being represented
should be required to pay for this service in proportion to the benefits he
receives from the union activities. In the majority of unions the member-
ship is usually large enough to defray the organization cost and expenses
of union activities, without forcing those who elect not to become members
to pay dues and initiation fees.
It is the writer's opinion that an examination of a particular union
organization might reveal that it shelters its own free riders. The organ-
ized free rider depends on his union leader to protect him and his ineffi-
ciency. This worker is willing to contribute as little as possible, watch
the clock, and have the shop steward protect him when he is cited for viola-
tion of rules in the shop. These members are delighted to pay their dues
and depend on the union leaders to advance their cause, when a responsible
non-member is relying on competency, efficiency, and devotion as a basis for
reward.
The union shop was not a mandatory requirement of the Taft-Hartley
Act. There are many workers in the nation who, because of religious con-
victions or a belief in personal, freedom, refrain from becoming union mem-
bers. To remedy this situation, the agency shop was created. Under this
form of security a worker is required to pay a sum equal to the initiation
fee and monthly dues. He may elect to join or not to join the union. If he
is a union member he is free to drop his union membershir and to keep his
Chamber of Commerce of the United States, "The Right of the Right to
Work," Washington, D. C, 19o5, p. 19.
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job If he agrees to continue paying the dues. The sum paid by the non-member
is considered a fee paid for having the union act as his agent in collective
"bargaining activities.
Although proponents argue that union dues must he paid by non-members,
there are substantial rtmons -why some workers feel this support r-hould not
be paid. Among these objections to union leadership and policies are lack
of confidence in management. Of fifty-six million workers in nonagricultural
establishments, thirty-nine million have not joined unions.
Most union contracts have seniority provisions which require that
newest workers be laid off first and the oldest members be rehired first.
This procedure may interfere with the union membership campaign. The young
workers do not benefit from representation in this situation.
If the motives of the union are based on sound principles and the
benefit of the membership served properly, unions should have little diffi-
culty in maintaining strong and universal membership. Whether the financial
support the unions are exacting from non-members is being used for the pur-
pose of paying financial costs related to collective bargaining has been
questioned.
Union Due3 and Initiation Fees
The negotiation of a union shop is permitted under the provisions of
the Taft-Hartley Act. When the union shop is negotiated a financial burden
is imposed on the xaembers. The extent of this burden will be examined here.
Usually a union is organized locally, with a national affiliation
and possible international relationships. It can be assumed that as the
u. S. Congress, Repeal of Section 1Mb) of the Ifetional Labor
Relations Act, as Amended, 59th Cong., 1st Sess., September 9, 19&5*

25
affiliation increases, the financial burden of the union grows proportion-
ately, in modern society the maintenance of a union organization is an ex-
pensive operation. Some of the general expenses are officer and employee
salaries, office rent, travelling expenses, communication costs, legal fees,
research costs, and routine administration charges. In an earlier discussion
the strike fund was mentioned; it is the responsibility of the members to
build a reserve of funds for payment in the event of a long strike.
The funds used to operate unions come from two primary sources:
monthly dues and initiation fees. The payment of dues is usually on a
monthly basis and is made at the local level. In Table 2 a breakdown of
dues from $0.00 to $35.00 is presented. There is a wide range in monthly
payments. The local union determines the amount to be paid by the members.
TABLE 2
UNION DOES June 30, i960.
Locals with Prevailing Fee Locals with a Maximum Fee
Amount Per Cumulative " Cumulative





$1.00 to $ 1.99
1.00 to $ 2.99
J3.00 to $ 3.99
$4.00 to $ 4.99
fe.00 to $ 5.99





































































Source : U. S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, Monthly Labor Review,
January, I961, p. 32.
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The national union receives a percentage of this amount, this being its
only means of financial support. The national headquarters in all likeli-
hood exercises some influence over the local union in determining the amount
to he paid by the members.
Initiation fees are paid to the local union when the member is placed
on the roles of the union. The magnitude and range of initiation fees as
depicted in Table 3 are much larger than the monthly dues. Two-thirds of
the locals reported a prevailing fee of less than $15.00. The most common
prevailing fee was $5*00 and the most common maximum fee was $10.00.
Dues and initiation fees tend to be higher in the older unions. One
reason why this condition exists is that the older unions are craft organi-
zations composed of skilled workers. These workers combine high earnings
potential with scarcity of employment. The unions feel that the present
high level of wages should require a large entrance fee for a new worker.
High entrance fees discourage new workers, so that more work is available
for those who are already members. The benefits in the older organizations
are sometimes greater than in newer unions. These benefits come from mem-
ber sponsorship and require higher contributions for continuation.
The Taft-Hartley Act required unions to completely disclose their
financial transactions and salaries paid to officials above $5,000. It was
felt that filing of these reports would promote judicious financial opera-
tions and disclose some of the abuses of union resources. An additional
restriction was the declaration that unions could not make direct contribu-
tions to the election of any candidate for a federal political office. In
Gordon Bloom and Herbert K. Korthrup, Economics of Labor Relations
































UNION INITIATION DUES JUNE 30, i960
Amount of
Initiation Fee
Locals with a Prevailing Fee
Cumulative
Number Percent Percent





No initiation fee 1,905 *«9
Less than $1.00 179 0.5
$1.00 1,291 3-3
$1.00 to $1.99 68 0.2
$2.00 1,956 5.0
$2.01 to $2.99 185 0.5
$3.00 to $3.99 1,365 3.5
$4.00 to $4.99 388 1.0
$5.00 9,625 24.8
$5.01 to $9.99 1,858 4.3
$10.00 5,372 13.8
$10.01 to $14.99 38l 1.0
$15.00 1,861 4.8
$15.01 to $24.99 939 2.4
$25.00 2,047 5.3
$25.01 to $49.99 808 2.1
$50.00 2,648 6.8
$50.01 to $99*99 1,319 3^
$100.00 1,3^0 3.5
$100.01 to $149.99 593 1.5
$150.00 610 1.6
$150.01 to $199.99 164 0.4
$200.00 472 1.2
$200.01 to $249.99 86 0.2
$250.00 177 0.5
$250.01 to $500.00 325 0.8
$500.01 to $1,400.00 17
Not determined 442 1.1

























































Source: U. S. Bureau of Lai or Statistics, Monthly Lft"bor Review
,
January, I96I, p. 33.
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a case in Georgia involving the use of union funds under a union shop agree-
ment, the defendants* unions were found guilty of expending union funds for
political purposes which had no necessary or reasonable relationship to
collective bargaining. The unions admitted substantially all of the facts
alleged in the complaint. Ike Geoi'gia Supreme Court upheld the lover
court.
The Taft-Hartley Act in section 8 (a) (3) states that "the employee
. . . tender the periodic dues and initiation fee" as a legal test of mem-
bership. Also included in the act is section 8 (b) (5) which protects the
employees against being required to pay excessive or discriainatory fees by
a
unions navies union shop agreements. Generally the complaints that are
brought forth arise from excessive initiation fees rather than dues. The
criterion used to determine whether initiation fees are excessive is an
examination of the fee paid relative to the benefits expected. It is con-
sidered to be an unfair labor practice to charge incriminatory or excessive
initiation fees under cce^ulsory-union contracts. It is also unlawful to
charge parttime or temporary employees^ who are not union members, an initia-
tion fee.
Whether or not an initiation fee is excessive depends upon the wage
level of the employees and consideration of the custom of the industry.
While a compulsory-union contract is in effect, a union is not required to
maintain its initiation fee at a constant level* During an organization
Tlancy M. Looper, et al * v. Georgia Southern & P. B. Co., Bibb
Superior Court, Ko. lo,537.
Tooper v. Georgia Southern & F. R. Co ., 213 Ga. 279; 99 S.E, 2nd 101.




campaign a union may announce a proposed increase in initiation fees to
attract members "before effecting the increase, or it may decrease initiation
fees to induce members to Join the union.
The Labor Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959* normally
referred to as the Landrum-Griffin Act, extends the Taft-Hartley Act in the
financial reporting aspect. Under the provisions of this act the unions are
prohibited from raising dues and initiation fees or from assessing members
vithout due notice of a scheduled referendum.
The collection of dues is also restricted by section 302 of the
Taft-Hartley Act. The dues of laembers are usually deducted from a member's
check by the employer and this procedure is commonly referred to as the
check-off. Under section 302 a check-off cannot be made unless the worker
has given authorization in writing, and the assignment cannot be made ir-
revocable for more than one year or beyond the termination date of the




THE PURPOSE AND ADMINISTRATION OF
RIGHT-TO-WORK IAWS
Scope and Enforcement
Right-to-work or right-to-wreck, compulsion or freedom, are two
phrases that have gained national prominence since the Taft-Hartley Act was
enacted. In the previous chapters the facets of labor-management relations
pertaining to union security on a national basis have been examined. In
this chapter attention will be focused on a particular section of the act
that has been a source of irritation to labor organizations for many years.
Section 14(b) of the Taft-Hartley Act states:
. . . nothing in this act shall be construed as authoriz-
ing the execution or application of agreements requiring mem-
bership in a labor organization as a condition of employment
in any State or Territory in which such execution or applica-
tion is prohibited by State or Territorial law.^
The effect of section 1Mb) is not to allow states to authorize
legislatively stronger forms of union security, such as the closed shop,
than are permitted under section 8(a) of the federal law, but rather to
allow states to prohibit forms of union security percaitted under the act.
Gerard D. Reilly, States Rights and the Law of Labor Relations




In 1947, when the legislation for the Taft-Hartley Act was being
formulated, the Senate version of the bill did not include section 14(b).
The Hartley House Bill contained this provision. Senator Taft accepted
this, and it has been argued that it was his feeling that it would not
apply to industries engaged in interstate commerce and thus preempt the
federal law.
Senator Taft said:
We considered the arguments very carefully in the com-
mittee and I myself came to the conclusion that since there
had been for such a long time so many union shops in the
United States, since in many trades it was entirely custom-
ary and worked satisfactorily, I at least was unwilling to
go to the extent of abolishing the possibility of a union
shop contract .... So I think it would be a mistake to
go to the extreme of absolutely outlawing a contract which
provides for a union shop, requiring all employees to join
the union, if that arrangement meets with the approval of
the employer and meets with the approval of a majority of
the employees, and is embodied in a written contract.
^
Many Members of Congress were opposed to the idea of giving state
governments the right to determine whether a federal law snail be in effect
in their states. Section 14(b) of the Taft-Hartley Act allows the states
to legislate a more restrictive labor policy than that provided under
federal law. The extent to which a labor organization endowed with
authority by Congress or state legislatures should be permitted to exert
coercive power to require contributions to its maintenance and well-being,
and the extent to which such an organization should be permitted to deter-
mine whether workers, otherwise employable, should be denied work or be
forced out of work, provide the basis for this determination.
l/eroy S. Merrifield, "The Union Shop and the Rational Labor Policy,"
The George Washington University Magazine , Vol. 2, Mo. 3 (Fall 19^5) > ?• 23.
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The following nineteen states have right-to-work legislation in
effect: Alabama, Arizona, Arkansas, Florida, Georgia, Iowa, Kansas,
Mississippi, Nebraska, Nevada, North Carolina, North Dakota, South Carolina,
South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, Utah, Virginia, and Wyoming. The state of
Louisiana has a law that applies specifically to agricultural employees
and certain agricultural processing employees. Efforts to pass right-to-
work legislation by public referendum have failed in California (twice),
Colorado, Idaho, Maine, Massachusetts, New Mexico, Ohio, Oklahoma, and
Washington (twice). Laws in general application have been repealed in
Delaware, Hawaii, Indiana, Louisiana, Maine, and New Hampshire.
One of the early states to pass right-to-work legislation was
Arkansas. The law, passed in 19^> is impartial, protecting the union
and nonunion employees:
No person shall be denied employment because of member-
ship or affiliation with or resignation from a labor union,
or because of refusal to Join or affiliate with a labor union;
nor shall any corporation or individual or association of any
kind enter into any contract, written or oral, to exclude
from employment members of a labor union or persons who re-
fuse to Join a labor union; nor shall any person against his
will be compelled to pay dues to any labor organization as
a prerequisite to or condition of employment.
2
All of the states that have right-to-work legislation have outlawed
the closed shop and the union shop, as summarized with the other provisions
James R. Wason, Section 14(b) of the Taft-Hartley Act and State
Right-to-Work Laws (Washington, D.C.: Library of Congress, March, 19&5) >
p. 18.
2Johnny H. Killian, Section 1Mb) of the Taft-Hartley Act (Wash-
ington, D.C.: Library of Congress, February, 1965) > P« 9»
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of the constitutional amendments (Table k). The agency shop is prohibited
specifically in eleven states and in the eight remaining states it has been
considered within their jurisdiction and outlawed based on rulings of the
1
attorney general of each state.
It is apparent that the enforcement of right-to-work laws varies
from state to state (Table 5). In ten states penalties for violation are
enumerated, while in states with a relatively large amount of industry
such as Texas, North Carolina, Florida, and Alabama, no penalties are
enumerated. In eleven of the nineteen states, civil damage suits may be
brought against violators. Eight states provide that conspiracies to
violate the law are illegal and in only nine states is injunctive relief
against violators provided for in the law.
To establish uniformity in the federal law governing union security
agreements, House Rule 77 was presented in June 1965, to amend section 8(a)
(3) to provide the positive declaration that no state law could prohibit
union security agreements which are permissible under the federal law. It
would not change the existing federal restrictions on security arrangements
now permitted under the act. In addition to those changes mentioned above,
section 705(b) of the Labor Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959
would be repealed to eliminate any possible confusion regarding the intent
that the uniform federal law would also be applicable to the construction
industry.
Herbert R. Northrup and Gordon F. Bloom, Government and Labor
(Homewood, Illinois: Richard D. Irwin, Inc., 19^3), p. 228.
u. S., Congress, Senate, Repeal of Section 14(b) of the National
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The second session of the Eighty-Ninth Congress was unable to
limit debate on House Rule 77 and it vas set aside Indefinitely vith the
words, "may it rest in peace." Repeal of section 14(b) would prevent state
laws from being applied to workers covered by the Taft-Hartley Act. It
would not prevent states from restricting union shop arrangements in indus-
tries engaged in intrastate commerce. Since the majority of employees
and collective bargaining arrangements are within the scope of interstate
commerce, restrictive state legislation would thus have only a limited
effect and application.
Results of the Fortune Survey
la 1957* Fortune magazine made a survey of the effects of right-to-
work laws in eighteen states. The survey did not include Kansas and Wyoming
since these states did not pass right-to-work legislation until 1958 and
1963, respectively. Fortune magazine noted that small business groups have
done most of the lobbying for right*to-work legislation. Few large corpora-
tions have taken a stand on the right-to-work issue.
A summary of the effects of the states* right-to-work lav* was
presented in the Personnel Journal in 1963 as follows:
Alabama (19^6): The impact of the right-to-work law
has been mainly psychological, i.e., since state policy is
suggested against strong unions, the law has made it a little
harder to organize workers.
Arizona (19^6): There is no effective enforcement machin-
ery in the state to enforce the right-to-work statute. The
closed shop continues to operate in construction craft unions.
Contractors generally hire union workers only, since union men




Arkansas (1944): Right-to-work has achieved little; the
closed shop did not generally exist even before the right-to-
work amendment.
Florida (1944) J Again, there has been little or no
effect due to lack of enforcement. The problem of enforce-
ment was referred to the Assistant General to study ways to
make the law more effective.
Georgia (1947) : Right-to-work has made 'ho appreciable
effect" according to the state A.F.L.-C.I.O. director. More
people have been unionized here since the law's enactment
than ever before.
Indiana (1957): This is probably the only major indus-
trial state which has a right-to-work law. Unions have suc-
ceeded in taking the teeth out of the law by resorting to
agency shop contracts — where the nonmember is forced to
pay a fee equivalent to union dues. (The agency shop ar-
rangement was recently held legal under federal law by the
U. S. Supreme Court.)
Iowa (1947): This is one of the few states where right-
to-work legislation has resulted in any appreciable resigna-
tion of union members from their unions. However, the move
of industry into Iowa has raised union membership to all
time highs. Craft unions remain closed shop in practice.
Mississippi (1954): Mississippi's right-to-work law
has been used to secure injunctions against some building
trades unions that picketed building sites demanding that
union labor be employed. Further, it has strengthened
anti-union sentiments somewhat and made organizing a little
more difficult.
Nebraska (1946): A.F.L.-C.I.O. membership has grown
slightly since enactment of this state's law. Ho appre-
ciable effect has been noticed.
Nevada (1952): A worker in Nevada can seek relief
under Nevada's law only by securing an injunction. This
has rendered the law largely useless. A high proportion
of union members in the building trades still are able to
bar nonunion men from work.
North Carolina (1947) : Between 1947 and 1957> union
membership increased 40# to about 80,000 members. Fortune
suggests that the state right-to-work law indirectly may
have contributed to this union growth by helping to attract
industry into North Carolina.
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North Dakota (19^#) : Former State Senator Milton Rue,
a contractor, is quoted by Fortune as follows: "It [right-
to-work] is a beneficial law to have, but there is no spe-
cific use for it now."
South Carolina (195**-) : Enforcement in South Carolina
has been termed as "sporadic." Most old union shop agree-
ments have been renewed without any particular difficulty.
South Dakota (1946): Building trades unions generally
still refuse to work with nonunion men, so contractors
avoid hiring nonunion workers. A union official is quoted
as saying, "We may have a right-to-work law, but there is
no have-to-work law."
Tennessee (19^7): Again, right-to-work has had little
practical effect. Repeated attempts at repeal have been
unsuccessful.
Texas (19**7): As of 1957* Texas had 350,000 union mem-
bers, an increase of 33$ prior to passage of the right-to-
work law. Union and management sources report the figure
would be only slightly higher if there were no such law.
Utah (1955): Union membership has not been changed
appreciably; one company reported that only about 2 - 33^
of the old union membership left the union after passage
of the law.
Virginia (19^7): Right-to-work has resulted in some
increase in nonunion building contractors find hampered
union organizing efforts somewhat.
^
The Right-to-Work, Pro and Con
Generally the proponents of right-to-work lavs are business man-
agers who object to any interference with their ability to hire and fire
workers. The opponents of this issue are the union officials who state
that their organization brings democracy to the work force; however in
performing this function they want the right to coerce workers into forced
membership and forced payment of dues. The states that have outlawed or
"Right-to-Work Legislation," Personnel Journal , Vol. 42, Ifo. 11
(December, 1963), 5^9-59, 572.
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restricted union security have a large rural vote. In the states where
unions are the weakest, right-to-work legislation has been easily enacted.
In this section will be reviewed the materials that have sustained this
controversy for nineteen years.
The principal argument for right-to-work legislation is based
upon the assumption that compulsory unionism violates the fundamental
rights of an individual guaranteed by the Constitution. In a democratic
society, membership or nonmembership in a union should not determine the
right of an individual to secure or keep a Job. Americans generally be-
lieve that freedom of association is a fundamental right of all individuals
and that the individual should be free to select the organization he
wishes to support and to which he may belong. These rights are protected
by the Ninth Amendment to the Constitution which states that "the enumera-
tion in the Constitution, of certain rights, shall not be construed to
deny or disparage others retained by the people" and these are protected
against impairment by governmental action in the First, Fifth, and Four-
teenth Amendments to the Constitution of the United States . The nineteen
states having so-called right-to-work legislation do not create new
rights, nor do they prevent an employer from discharging an employee for
cause or lack of work; they seek merely to protect the fundamental right
of the individual from invasion through the imposition of compulsory union
membership as a condition of securing or retaining employment.
Library of Congress, national Labor Policy , 89th Cong., 1st
Sees., Senate, May 19^5, Document 32, p. 199*
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The Ninth Amendment is a basic statement of the inherent rights
of an individual. With freedom being the basic characteristic of our
democratic society, many arguments for right-to-vork legislation claim
that this should include the right of an individual to seek, secure, and
retain employment without the pressure to Join or pay tribute to any pri-
vate organization.
A further argument contends that freedom of association is a
composite of rights protected by the First Amendment, with particular
emphasis given to the freedom of speech and assembly. This section of
the Constitution gives the individual the right to live as he chooses and
to select those organizations he may wish to Join or refrain from Joining.
Individuals are free to choose political parties, Join religious groups,
fraternities, social clubs, and civic organizations; however, to coerce
a worker to Join a labor organization to retain employment is a violation
of his right of freedom of association.
An additional argument proposed to support right-to-work is that
compulsory unionism does not exist in most of the free western European
nations. Compulsory unionism is prohibited in France, Western Germany,
Belgium, Holland, Denmark, Austria, and Switzerland by constitution,
statute, or Judicial decision. This argument claims that the United
States, as the leader of the free world, should not sanction compulsory
unionism, nor permit it to exist.
Management groups feel that compulsory unionism forces workers




They contend that after surrendering this basic freedom, the workers be-
come anonymous units of highly organized unions in which they are forced
to accept the opinions of the union leaders with regard to social, political,
and economic affairs. Individuals must then accept the decisions of a
majority with regard to their personal well-being.
Cases have arisen where workers lost their Jobs because the religion
to which they belonged prohibited its members from joining societies,
unions, or other organizations. These workers had to violate their reli-
gious convictions or give up their livelihood.
Thus, the arguments for right-to-work legislation claim to prove
that compulsory union membership relates to the deprivation of some of an
individual's rights guaranteed under the Constitution.
The arguments against right-to-work legislation come from the labor
unions which state that the motives of right-to-work laws are to weaken
and cripple labor unions, not to protect the worker's rights. The unions
feel that union security clauses and forced membership are consistent
with democratic traditions and ethically right. The unions argue that
the majority should rule. When workers vote for compulsory union security
clauses, the minority should be forced to join the majority to strengthen
the union and to increase the power of the majority. Majority rule is
recognized as a democratic form of organization; the individual who re-
linquishes a certain amount of freedom receives greater benefits from
group action. Results of the National Labor Relations Board elections
cited earlier stand as evidence that the union shop was favored by a
strong majority of the workers.
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The elected bargaining representative represents all workers In
the unit; it is the contention of union leaders that since nonunion
members receive benefits to the same extent as the union members they,
too, should contribute financial support to the union. The unions argue
that since membership in some private organizations, such as the bar
associations, is compulsory, why should workers be given the opportunity
to refuse union membership?
The organization of all workers into unions is the primary goal
of union leaders. The unions contend that they need union security
contracts to strengthen their position with employers, to protect them
against rival unions, and to assist them in organizing unorganized workers.
The leaders further state that if all the workers in a bargaining unit
are members of the union, they are in a position to exercise control and
fulfill the obligations to the employer that they assumed under the labor
contract. The union leaders feel that compulsory membership promotes in-
dustrial peace and improves labor management relations.
Unions enable a worker to voice his opinions with regard to
wages, hours, and general working conditions. The unions feel that it
is advantageous for a worker to Join a union and that union membership
should be compulsory. In addition, a union member must pay tribute to
the union for representation. This practice has led to the incorpora-
tion of the agency shop [chapter II] provision in many labor agreements.
The unions state that any legal restrictions which prohibit or
interfere with the negotiation of union security clauses deprive the
union of the freedom to negotiate a contract; hence, industrial unrest
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and poor labor management relations result. The negotiation of a union
security agreement implies the acceptance of the union by management;
however, right-to-work legislation prohibits union-management acceptance.
The largest single group of customers is composed of wage earners
whose buying power is concentrated in their pay checks. The unions feel
that by improving customer buying power they are building the economy.
The unions contend that right-to-work laws weaken their ability to Improve
the economic status of the members and therefore weaken the economy of
the community in which they exist.
The issues that have been examined are a reflection of the basic
struggle presented by management or labor regarding right-to-work legis-
lation and purely emotional rather than factual. They all contain ele-
ments of truth; however, the interpretation of the truth depends largely
on where one's self-interests lie.

CHAPTER V
STATUS OF RIGHT-TO-WORK STATES
Wages and Personal Income
If one were able to establish that right-to-work states
as a whole showed economic gains or losses relative to other
states and that such gains and losses were not shared by
similarly situated states without such laws, then one might
reasonably attribute some part of the effect to the presence
or absence of such laws.1
The right-to-work states are grouped into two geographical areas,
one extending from Virginia through the southeast into Texas; the other
area includes nine states in the Plains, Mountain, and Southwest Regions
of the United States. Indiana is considered as part of the Great Lakes
Region. The adoption of right-to-work legislation follows no particularly
discerrible economic, political, or social pattern. Proponents of right-
to-work laws say that such laws stimulate the economy of the region and
that wages in these areas have increased a pace faster than the national
average. All right-to-work laws have had at least three years in existence
upon which to base statistics. Wyoming passed right-to-work laws in
February 1963 •
An examination of the hourly wages in the manufacturing industries
of right-to-work states reveals several interesting statistics. A com-
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reveals that right-to-work states paid 21 cents below the United States
average of $1.47 per hour. In 1964* the average hourly wages in the
right-to-work states were twenty-four cents an hour less than the national
average of $2.53. Between 1950 and 1964 the maximum difference in hourly
wages between the national average and that prevalent in the right-to-work
states was twenty-six cents (in 1955); the smallest difference has been
twenty-one cents. It is interesting to note that the national average in
hourly wages has improved over the 1950 level by 72$, whereas the right-
to-work states have increased by 82$ over the same period.
The pattern of weekly wages has followed a similar trend. In
1950 the average weekly wage of workers in right-to-work states was
$52.47. In 1964 the average weekly wage rose to $95.00, v7,97 below the
national average of $102.97* The difference between weekly wages in the
right-to-work states and the national average rose from $6.86 in 1950 to
$7.97 in 1964. The year 1958 produced the smallest difference in weekly
wages when the gap closed to $6.39* Data are not available to substantiate
the fact that wages paid in right-to-work states have increased at a per-
centage faster than nationwide averages. The gains in real dollars have
been smaller than the national average.
The per capita personal income trend in the right-to-work states
has been behind the national average and has behaved much the same as the
trend in hourly wages. In 1947 the average per capita personal income
for the nineteen right-to-work states was $230 below the national average.
"Statistical Abstract of the United States , Washington, D.C.:
U. S. Department of Commerce, 1965, tfuth ed., p. 241.
•
Vf
By 1950 the difference had increased to $28l, and in 1963 in the right-
to-work states the per capita income was $509 "below the national average.
Prom a percentage standpoint the national average between 1950 and I963
grew 6k<fo and the right-to-work states expanded their per capita income by
Gofa, In 1963 two right-to-work states, Nevada and Wyoming, had per
capita incomes that were above the national average.
Evidence presented seems to indicate the right-to-work states
have been able to improve their economic status without the benefit of
compulsory unionism. The right-to-work states have not been able to
equal the national averages in income, but it is significant to note that
their rate of increase is greater than the national average.
The increase in wages and income in the right-to-work states may
be due to national wage patterns established in negotiations between
large companies and unions, or the increased minimum wage levels guaran-
teed by the Fair Labor Standards Act. The increase in the wage levels
can be attributed partially to the shift from agricultural to nonagricul-
tural industries.
Trends in Union Membership
It is difficult to attribute any change in total union membership
to right-to-work legislation. The impact of right-to-work laws will not
he immediately measurable because the laws do not invalidate existing
contracts, but prohibit their future negotiation or extension. Any mem-





Table 7 shows eight states with a net gain in membership, eight states
with a net loss, and three states remained unchanged from 1958 to 1962.
In the states where membership was reduced, right-to-work legis-
lation had been in effect for approximately six to ten years, with the
exception of Kansas, Utah, and Mississippi. Those union members who
were dissatisfied with unionism might be presumed to have canceled their
memberships earlier in most states. The impact of the legislation might
be tested in Indiana and Kansas which passed their state right-to-work
legislation in 1957 and 1958* respectively. Between 195$ and 1962, union
membership increased in Indiana by 8$ or 26,000 members while in Kansas
membership dropped by 65,000 members or 43.1$.
Labor leaders feel that right-to-work legislation slows union
growth. As shown in Table 7, where right-to-work legislation was non-
existent, membership increased in nine states, decreased in twenty states,
and remained unchanged in four states. In the non-right-to-work states
membership in unions between 1958 and I962 dropped in 67$ of the states.
From these figures it may be possible to advance the theory that member-
ship in right-to-work states is less likely to be adversely affected
than in states without such laws.
A comparison of union membership between 1958 and 1962 in the
right-to-work states and the total AFL-CIO figures shows a slight de-






TREND IN UNION MEMBERSHIP BY STATES, 1958-1962
State, With Date Trend
Right-to-Work Law 1958 i960 1962 1958-1962
Was Enacted (000) T006) (000)
Total Membership Reported 13,881. 2 13,377.8 13,379.8 Down
Alabama 1953 185.O 185.O 185.0 None
Alaska n.a. 22.3 30.0 Down
Arizona 1946 40.0 80.0 76.0 up
Arkansas 1944 72.0 72.0 72.0 None
California 1,600.0 1,350.0 1,400.0 Down
Colorado 114.2 90.0 108.0 Down
Connecticut 155.0 200.0 185.0 up
Delaware 29.0 28.0 16.0 Down
Florida 1944 160.0 150.0 150.0 Down
Georgia 19^7 H5.O 115.0 120.0 up
Idaho 17.0 20.0 14.0 Down
Illinois 1,200.0 1,200.0 1,250.0 up
Indiana 1957 323.1 350.0 350-0 up
Iowa 19^7 130.0 ~^.o 100.0 Down
Kansas 1956 150.0 100.0 85.0 Down
Kentucky 140.0 132.0 135.0 Down
Louisiana 150.0 130.0 130.0 Down
Maine -
Maryland
61.0 68.0 58.0 Down
300.0 300.0 275.0 Down
Massachusetts 400.0 600.0 525.0 up
Michigan 800.0 700.0 750.0 Down
Minnesota 250.0 250.0 300.0 up
Mississippi 1954 50.0 45.0 45.0 Down
Missouri 500.0 450.0 400.0 Down
Montana 45.0 50.0 30.0 Down
Nebraska 1946 70.0 65.O 50.0 Down
Nevada 1951 10.1 16.0 18.0 up
New Hampshire 45.0 50.0 50.0 up
Mm Jex'sey 575.0 500.0 500.0 Down
New Mexico 30.0 17.0 35.0 up
New York 2,000.0 2,000. .> 2,000.0 None
North Carolina 1947 80.0 80.0 80.0 None
North Dakota 19^7 7.2 ,.0 15.0 up
Ohio 1,250.0 1,000.0 1,000.0 Down
Oklahoma 82.0 50.0 65.0 Down
Oregon 200.0 l'O.O 140.0 Down
Pennsylvania n.a. 1,500.0 1,250.0 Down




State, With Date Trend
Right-to-Work Law 1958 i960 1962 1958-1962
Was Enacted (000) [006) (000)
South Carolina 195^ 35-0 35.0 4o.o up
South Dakota 19^6 15.0 17.0 17.0 UP
Tte inessee 19 ] :-7 175.0 11*0.0 150.0 Down
Team 19^7 375.0 375.0 350.0 Down
Utah 1955 60.0 45.0 45.0 Down
Vermont 10.0 7.5 9.5 Down
Virginia 19^7 95.0 95.0 100.0 up
Washington 100.0 350.0 250.0 up
West Virginia 70.0 70.0 95.0 up
Wisconsin 301.0 400.0 264.0 Down
Wyoming 18.0 15.0 17.0 Down
Estimate by State Federation of Labor in each State.
National data figure used. Total without Pennsylvania
13,289.5 million.
3
Included District of Columbia.
Source : U. S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, Directory of National Unions





Total AFL-CTO membership 13,88l.O 13,977.8 13,375-5
Membership in right-to-work states 2,147.3 2,118.0 2,0^.0




These figures are inconclusive, and cannot "be used to substantiate
a claim that right-to-work legislation causes members to discontinue
their memberships.
Pressure on Union Finances
Unions need a regular income to conduct their business operations;
the main source of union income is from membership dues. In recent years
automation, industry relocation and other factors have had an adverse
effect on union memberships. Unions in these industries have been forced
to curtail organizing efforts, lay off representatives, and reduce pro-
grams because of the reduced income from declining membership. Requests
to union members to increase dues to offset loss of income puts union
officials in an unpopular position.
An examination of compulsory union membership provisions and their
effect on union membership, income, and power reveals several facts:
1. In the absence of compulsory membership pro-
visions, a substantial percentage of American
workers will not join unions.
2. Union security provisions thus add signifi-
cantly to union membership and dues.
3. Once workers join unions, they tend to remain
members even in the absence of union security
provisions.!
HJ. S. Congress, Senate, National Labor Policy , Document 32, p. 172.
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In the elections that were conducted by the national Labor
Relations Board it was found that between five and twelve percent of the
eligible workers were opposed to the union shop, and approximately twelve
to nineteen percent elected not to participate in the voting. From these
statistics it is reasonable to assume that a fair number of workers would
rather not be committed to the payment of union dues. The loss of union
income has a twofold effect. The costs of operation, administration of
the contract, and collective bargaining remain constant. As union income
falls because of declining membership, the current members become dis-
turbed over the fact that the benefits accrue to free riders. The union
loses more members and the recruitment of new employees becomes more
difficult. The original loss of income tends to produce a further de-
crease in union funds.
The larger plants for the most part are unionized and offer little
opportunity for increases in membership. In the small plants, where
there is a possibility for increasing membership, union organization and
administration costs are proportionately heavier, which further increases
the burden on union finances.
There has been very little research in how the states* right-to-
work laws affect unions. In the words of Professor James W. Kuhn, . . .
we believe that they [right-to-work laws] have a decided and substantial







The historic struggle that has divided union and management
forces continues unresolved. An interesting fact about right-to-work
legislation is that a close examination of the arguments both for and
against reveals that there is only limited basis in fact for most of
them. The arguments presented by both union and management groups re-
garding the issue are basically rationalized and emotional rather than
factual.
The arguments for right-to-work laws is normally presented as a
moral crusade for the freedom of the individual to choose whether or not
to join a labor organization. Management forces point to the noble
democratic traditions of freedom of conscience, choice, association,
and religion as evidence in support of right-to-work legislation.
The unions counter that it is undemocratic for nonunion members
to share in the "benefits won through collective bargaining, and that com-
pulsory unionism is in reality democratic and ethically right. They make
light of management's concern for the rights of employees and accuse man-
agement of hypocrisy concerning this issue. The moral appeal has been a
difficult concept for unions to oppose, since compulsion in any form is
generally an anathema to the spirit of American democracy and individuality.
The major issues are far from being settled, since both sides have




or qualitatively. The problem of trying to find a factual basis also
extends to the area of measuring the effects of existing right-to-work
legislation. In this area various statistics can he manipulated and
quoted to prove or disprove statements of either side, depending upon
which statistics are chosen and hov they are interpreted.
Among all the conflicting issues is the basic issue of union
security and its ultimate relationship to collective bargaining power.
Compulsory unionism, or union security, means numerical and financial
power for a union that it might not otherwise have if workers are free
to reject membership and retain employment.
It is unlikely that any action will be taken to either modify
or repeal the existing legislation. The campaign both for and against
right-to-work legislation will depend upon prevailing national and state
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